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Abstract
The sections of this paper deal in sequence with the philosophical
concept of similarity; its relation to measurement theory and measurement
scales; and their relation to accounting theory, with particular attention
to measurement in terms of money and financial reports. Measurement Is
seen as a complex web of similarity relations between numerals, concepts,
and real object characteristics. In accounting theory, the difference
between price and value Is emphasized. The conclusions are (1) that
accounting for values can never be a scientific measurement discipline,
and (2) that financial reports should be grounded on events theory with
market price emphasis if accounting is to become more nearly a scientific
measurement science.

ON THE CONCEPT OF SIMILARITY
AND SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR ACCOUNTING THEORY
The goal of this paper is to aid the cause of logical consistency in ac-
coimting theory through concern for the structure of what is (claimed to be)
known rather than for heuristic operations. The precise use of crucial dis-
tinctions developed here will reduce conceptual vagueness and enhance logical
consistency.
Consider the following example of conceptual error and its source. Titae
is often represented as an interval along a line, with the origin toward the
left. Movement forward through time, say the period from 1776 to 1976, is de-
picted as movement from left to right between two points on the line. Thus, con-
cepts of space are used by analogy to express concepts of time. Now, what about
movement from right to left? The space/time analogy is not ismorphic. While
we can move backward in space toward an arbitrary origin, we cannot move back-
ward in time. Semantically , "backward in time" has no empirical referent.
Syntactically, "backward in time" is a contradiction because "time" is defined
as .having a single direction of motion. (Notice the spatial overtones of direc-
tion and motion.) The conceptual error comes from transferring operations that
are possible in one language erroneously onto the field of another language. A
converse error would result if time, being defined as a vector, were used to
represent space with a one-direction constraint.
The rules of one language, say mathematics, may permit certain combinations
of signs that have no meaning when lifted into another language, say geography
or account classification. The clarity of arithmetic calculations is liable to
lead to confusion when the terms and relations of a math model are used to force
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pieces of non-quantitative theory (i.e., the logic of categorical relations)
into empirically meaningless propositions. That is to say, transferring the
syntax of one language to speak of a re], .-esentation in anoi-her language inevi-
tably poses conceptual errors that may distort our organization of experience
in the second language. Therefore we must avoid the mistake of mixing up the
grammars of different language systems. Similarly, we must avoid the mistake
of confusing any language for reality. For example, the representation of the
earth by Mercator's projection could lead tinskeptical explorers into some very
strange polar experiences if they used the map literally to perceive Antarctica
as the set of projected relations. The tyranny of such perception is an insane
hubris whose cure is humility.
Likewise, the clarity of arithmetic calculations in computing debit and
credit amounts for accounting can lead both theorists and practitioners into
some strange polar extremes. Whereas the concrete materiality of Antarctica
is demonstrably immune to any attempt toward verbal imposition of a geographical
rearrangement based on Mercator's projection, the conceptual nature of categori-
cal definitions and relations in the syntax of accounting is less resistant to
mentally distorting impositions based on the grammar of mathematics. This lower
resistance may help to explain recurrent attempts to define liabilities as nega-
tive assets [Ijlrl, 1957, p. 71], and persistent difficulties in accounting for
what-you-may-call-its [Sprouse, 1966].
Language translation is ambiguous and misleading if it allows terms and
relations in formal mathematics to dominate the substantive thinking in account-
ing. This problem is particularly severe where the object or characteristic to
be measured has not been satisfactorily identified. Unfortunately,
"The analogy [between one language instance and another] itself
never shows that it is misapplied; this is shown only when the
logic of the analogy is compared with the logic of the possibilities
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it is used to describe, and such comparison is usually a tedi-
ous and difficult process." [Watson, p. 230]
A philosophical consideration of similarity can help us clarify such prob-
lems by providing a logical structure for their specific analysis. The follow-
ing sections deal in order with kinds of similarity, measurement theory, measure-
ment scales, and accounting theory with particular attention to laonetary
measurement.
KINDS OF SniILARITY
In this section we distinguish among kinds of objects, kinds of character-
istics, and kinds of relations.
Let the characteristics of a language fix the boundaries for a universe
of discourse. Let the universe of discourse consist of three sets of substan-
tially different kinds of reference objects which exist outside of language.
These three sets are natural (including social) objects, artificial concrete
objects, and conceptual objects. To illustrate these primitive terms, for
"natural" object think of the Atlantic ocean; for "artificial concrete" object
think of a ship; and for "conceptual" object think of a theory of navigation.
Alternatively, think of a business entity, financial reports, and a theory of
accounting.
Any object has two kinds of characteristics: inherent elements, and in-
ternal relations (both structural and functional). Just as one object can be
an element intrinsic to an encompassing object, so a relation which is external
to one system may be internal to a larger system. External or environmental re-
lations are circumstantial and not characteristic. For example, the ownership
relation between possessor and possessed is an external relation which is not
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inherent or characteristic of either object. The term "property" will be used
to express the relation of circumstantial ownership in contrast to the relation
of inherent characteristics. An event is any change in characteristics or
circumstances.
Just as there are no objects without characteristics, there are no indepen-
dent characteristics. Thus we observe physical objects and objective relations,
and then for measurement abstract from them the characteristics of major interest.
When one object has a characteristic that is like a characteristic of another
object, the two objects are said to be similar with regard to their common
characteristic. This relation is sometimes referred to as "mapping." Two simi-
lar objects are "paired" \ftth each other. These partners are said to "share"
the same characteristic (s) . A similarity relation is external to both partners,
and characteristic of neither alone. Similarity is both factual and formal.
As to factual similarity, since either or both objects may be natural,
artificial, or conceptual, there are six kinds of pairs. (There would be nine
if sequence were relevant.) The similarity is "substantial" if both objects
are natural, bot i artificial, or both cc iceptual. No special terms have been
developed to denote each of the six kinds of factual similarity, perhaps be-
cause there is no inherent basis for rational ordering. Only an arbitrary,
imposed sequence is possible for arranging the six kinds of factual similarity.
Assume for the sake of an overly simple illustration in Table I that each ob-
ject has a hole in it, and that this internal structure is the shared charac-
teristic for similarity pairing.
As to formal similarity, considering the variety of human perceptions, at
least three kinds may be distinguished. [Ackoff, 1962; Bunge, 1970]. If the
relation is symmetric (like brotherhood), it is an analogy. If the relation is
non-symmetric (like parenthood) it is simulation or copy. If the relation is
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purely symbolic (like ">" or "$") it is a representation or proxy. Analogy
is strictly analytic, while simulation and representation are pragmatic. A
copy may be useful in its own right; but a proxy is essentially semantic. Given
the variety of human motivation and morality, the most useful proxy (represen-
tation) is not necessarily the simplest, easiest, or truest. It depends on the
user and the used. The "most useful" for some (private or. alleged public) goal
may be a complex, difficult, lie. [Tabor, 1976] Equity Funding, Watergate, and
CIA activities are good examples of misrepresenting representations. Misrepre-
sentations can take two forms: the presence or the absence in the assertion
of elements or relations that are, respectively, absent or present in the
referent.
Unlike factual similarities, formal similarities are subject to ordering,
both as to kind and degree. Bunge [1970, p. 30] discusses six degrees of for-
mal similarity, as presented in Table II, from strongest (isomorphic) to weakest
(plain). The same ordering holds for analogy, simulation, and representation.
The strength of a similarity relation depends on the degree to which knowledge
about the characteristics of one object conveys knowledge about the character-
istics of the second object.
The five stronger degrees of formal similarity are all reflexive, transi-
tive and class-equivalent for analogy, simulation, and representation. But the
weakest similarity, plain analogy, is not sufficiently strong to establish a
set or class of objects. Objects are very different if their only similarity
is a plain analogy. The factual and formal aspects of similarity are positive
characteristics of a conceptual relation between objects. Difference is not
a positive characteristic and is understood only as the negation, opposite, or
absence of similarity. Intentional misrepresentations assert non-existent
similarity or deny existent differences, and conceivably range from the weakest
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TABLE II
FORMAL SIMILARITY RELATIONS BETWEEN OBJECTS
BY KINDS AND DEGREES
Degrees
of Formal
Similarity
KINDS OF FORMAL SIMILARITY
1 Isomorphic
2 Homomorphic
3 Bij active
A Inj active
5 Contagious
ANALOGY SIMULATION REPRESENTATION
6 Plain (not defined)

-7B-
TABLE II - continued
Definitions:
(1) Isomorphic, or perfect similarity exists when all properties
(every element and relation) are paired exactly without exception.
(2) HomoEiorphic similarity exists when all properties (both
elements and relations) of one object are present in the second object,
but the second object is not thereby exhausted;
(3) Bijective similarity exists when only the elements in both
objects are exhaustively paired, but their relations are not exhaustively
paired;
(4) Injective similarity exists when all the elements of one object,
but not the relations, are paired and the second-object is not thereby
exhausted;
(5) Contagious similarity exists when only some characteristic (s)
of each object are shared, either elements or relations.
(6) Plain analogy, the weakest fc m of similarity, (xists when the
relation is non-transitive;butit is the first step toward classification
and generalization.
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form of white lie to the strongest forms wherein isomorphism is totally vio-
lated. Relations cannot be classified with respect to differences except as a
transformation of factual and formal similarities. To the extent that reference
objects in discourse can be absolutely different, plain analogy is less than
universal.
Considering both factual and formal similarity, there are conceivably at
least 36 different analogies; 30 different simulations; and 30 different repre-
sentations. That totals 96 as a theoretical maximum. However, since isomor-
phic (and perhaps homomorphic) similarity exists only for substantial relations,
the practical maximum is 73. The context of a statement or question will not
always unambiguously convey which similarity Is being discussed. So in search
of logical consistency, when things are said to be "like" each other, precise
attention must be paid to critical analysis. This is of major practical iinpor-
tance in accoimting measurement where economic consequences follow from surro-
gate/principal representations that range from deliberately phoney to fanciful
to factually precise.
Bunge 11970- p. 34] indicates that the following mistakes can easily be
avoided by referring to a framework which distinguishes among similarities:
a) mistaking plain analogy for the far stronger (transitive) rela-
tion of class equivalence.
b) speaking of isomorphism (or perfect formal analogy) when a much
weaker relation (plain analogy) is involved.
c) believing that a conceptual model or analogue to be true, must
be a mirror image (bijective similarity) of its referent.
d) believing that pictorial or visualizable models are essential .
to theoretical science—even when the referents are liapercep-
tible, as is the case of electrons or nations.
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Just as sets of objects may be classified by similarity relations, sets of
relations (ownership, similarity, etc.) may be classified by their characteris-
tics. For example, consider the formal similarity between the factual similarity
relations in Table I. The formal similarity between factual similarities I
(i.e., a hole in a rock and a hole in a bone) and III (i.e., a hole in astronomy
theory and a hole in medical theory) is stronger than plain analogy (since I and
III are both substantial relations) but weaker than homomorphic (since I is
natural and III is conceptual).
We turn now to the relevance of similarity, as a philosophical problem^to
measurement theory.
SIMILARITY AND l^fEASUREMENT THEORY
Even the simplest fundamental measure is a complex of many similarity rela-
tions. Too often isomorphism is blithely asserted rather than convincingly
argued. Researchers too often fail to explain why a given relation among nu-
merals necessarily represents a relation among natural objects. In consequence,
numerically accu.ate calculation is too -ften mistaken for sufficient evidence
of enq)irical correspondence. Too often we neglect a crucial part of Campbell's
definition of measurement, [1920, 1928] namely that the assignment of numerals
must be in virtue of laws governing the characteristics. It is not enough to
be concerned only with the laws of numbers. Too readily we tend to forget
Buchanon's insight [p. 95]:
"Magnitude as a property of things is a condensed result of
analogical reasoning. When we ask. How much? the answer we
expect and are satisfied with is a mathematical metaphor. Five
pounds means that some physical object is to some other
physical object (the standard weight) as five is to one."
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The strength of a metaphor depends, like the strength of a chain, upon
the weakest of its linking similarities. A lengthy derived (or secondary)
measure could involve up to 73 different kind/degrees of similarities, and an
even larger total of similarity instances. The final figure might be no
stronger than a plain analogy if representativeness were not carefully guarded.
It is, therefore, a gross simplification to say measurement is merely the
assignment of numbers to things.
In this section we discuss the details of the measurement metaphor. Its
complexity is suggested by Table III. (The relation between Table III, an
artificial object, and the conceptual system of measurement is somewhere be-
tween contagious and homomorphic representation.) We start by examining the
rows as systems, then the columns as elements, and then the content of cells.
Proceeding from top to bottom in the row captions, the universe of dis-
course has three objects and three relations represented by the single-headed
vertical arrows. Artificial object systems such as numerals may represent con-
ceptual objects such as numbers. This representation may be isomorphic, though
not necessarily so. The ancient Greeks were handicapped because their arith-
metic lacked a numeral to represent zero. In their universe of discourse, nu-
merals were only homomorphic to numbers. Even without numeral representation,
they did use the concept of zero implicitly as the base for counting—otherwise
they could not have counted—and for higher arithmetical computations.
Next in turn, numbers nay represent elemental and relational characteris-
tics of both the number system itself and of other conceptual object systems.
The factual relation between numbers and characteristics is substantial, since
both are conceptual objects. Within the syntactic limits of language, and
within the substantive limits of some theory, these relations are subject to
stipulation and specification by deduction.
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Again in turn, conceptual characteristics may represent elemental and
relational characteristics of, ultimately, artificial and natural objects.
The rows of Table III do not show that some concepts may represent other con-
cepts, but his sinplification does not reduce the general nature of Table III
for representing a broad understanding of the measurement metaphor.
Whereas the object rows have class names (numerals, numbers, characteris-
tics, and real objects) the object columns are not classes and do not have
class names. The arrows pointing upward in object columns 1, 3, and 5 repre-
sent the direction of representation: numerals represent natural objects, not
vice versa, by way of conceptual relations. The object columns are related by
substantial analogy, as represented by the horizontal doubleheaded arrows in
columns 2 and 4.
In the first column, "0" is the symbol to represent zero. The quotation
marks emphasize that the quoted content is here viewed strictly as symbolic.
Zero is the conceptual starting point or base for counting. The real world
phenomenon of nothing (the absence or void of some dimension) is designated by
an unquoted 0. (The absence of quotation marks here is to emphasize that the
referent of this sign is a real world phenomenon.) Similarly, in the third
column, "1" is the symbol to designate the concept of unity, which is the stan-
dard for comparison. The real world referent or counterpart of this conceptual
standard is 1. Finally, in the fifth column, "x" is the symbol to designate
any numeral (say, "5") which is the representation of the number measure assigned
to the subject being measured. Again, the real world referent, some tangible
(natural or artificial) object or relation is designated by the imquoted X.
Thus, at a minimum 17 instances of similarity relations (all of the arrows
in Table III) are behind any valid measurement statement that X is "x." This
minimum will occur in the sinqjlest fundamental measure of an extensive
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characteristic of a tangible object- The assignment of numerals to other kinds
of characteristics of intangible objects will involve more than 17 instances
of similarity, with formal strength considerably less than homomorphic.
Measurement theory can be condensed (by paying attention to only the right
three columns and glossing over the middle rows in Table III) to the deceptively
simple operation, "assigning numerals to things . " The Buchanon metaphor is it-
self a condensation of Table III: "1" is to "5" as one physical object (1) is
to another physical object (5). Such a condensed theory of measurement leaves
out the very grounds by consideration of which one could judge whether a measure
is valid. Presuming isomorphism to exist between a numeral relation system and
an empirical relation system is not a safe shortcut. Such presumption ignores
the fact that backgroimd theory is essential to substantiate the abstraction
of characteristics for measurement.
Four factual similarity relations in the universe of discourse stand out
as immediate problems in measuring. These are labeled in Table III as follows:
('=) The substantial analogy between the standard and subject;
(6) The si'istantial analogy betwer i two magnitude concepts;
(Y) The representation of the standard by the unity concept;
(6) The representation of the subject by the magnitude concept
assigned as its measure.
Each of the four factual similarities will have one of five or six possi-
ble degrees of formal similarity, from plain to isomorphic.
"The fundamental problem of epistemology," according to Caws [p. 250] "is
exactly to discover on what grounds we may assume that connections and tenden-
cies in the mind are reflections of connections and tendencies in the world."
And as Bunge enphasizes [1970, p. 30], "Outside mathematics, isomorphic repre-
sentation seems to be an unattainable ideal—a goal that one strives for, hoping
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to come closer to it well knowing that it cannot be reached." The characteris-
tics of language (as a universe of conceptual objects for discourse) are sub-
stantially different from the characteristics of reality (as a separate uni-
verse of natural and artificial objects to which language may refer). The only
perfect similarity that man can demonstrate is a relation between conceptual
objects. Therefore, an example of impossibly pure idealism is "an accounting
system. . .contemplated which is iscmorphic with the system of actual events which
impinge directly on an entity." [Chambers, p. 126]
It is not valid to claim isomorphism between a numeral relation system
and another relation system unless, as concep ts , they are perfectly paired in
all characteristics. If an empirical relation system is thought to be one of
real world objects existing outside and only referenced by the universe of dis-
course, then measurement is not isomorphic because conceptual and physical
(natural or artificial) objects are substantially dissimilar. Otherwise, if
the empirical relation system is thought to be one of abstracted characteris-
tics of conceptual objects, then measurement of real referents is at best hypo-
thetical. This luandry caitnot be avoided by defining "measurement" operationally
for two reasons: (1) only statements, and not terms, can be made to correspond
to operations [Bunge, 1967, p. 143], and (2) a definition is a relation of sub-
stantial analogy between signs rather than a representation. Representation
by a sign of its referent object is a referition, and "any definition of a word
denoting an external thing must ultimately rely on pointing at such a thing."
[Polanyl, 1967, p. 5] The goal of theory is a better conceptual representation
of a real (extra-lingual) system. This representation can be only hypothetical
and never substantial because the nature of language is not the same as the
nature of reality.

-15-
The following basic questions must be answered in any thorough analysis
of a measurement metaphor:
(1) Are tht concepts of zero and uiity in the number system
accurately paired with the conceptual base and standard?
(2) Do the concepts of base and standard have real world
referents?
(3) What scientific theory establishes the existence of an em-
pirical (real world) relation system?
(4) What numeral scale (noniinal, ordinal, interval, or ratio)
is most similar to the variation in the empirical (real world)
relation system?
With these questions in mind, we now consider further the relation between
similarity relation systems and measurement scales.
SIMILARITY AND MEASUREMENT SCALES
Artificial objects, such as Arabic or Roman numerals, may represent con-
ceptual elements and relations of the number system. In turn, numbers are use-
ful representations because they can refer to magnitude characteristics of con-
ceptual systems which in turn represent objects in the real world. A language
of some numeral relations system ("NRS") is useful as science when it represents
an extra-lingual, real world empirical relations system (ERS) of natural objects.
Meaning (CRS), a conceptual relation system, is attached to the numeral artifacts
(as description, explanation, prediction, or prescription) in the understanding
with language which mediates natural and artificial objects. "Only believers
in the magical power of signs can hold that signs have a value [meaning] in
them." [Bunge, 1967, p. 135]
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Mattesaich has hinted that the niunber system can be viewed as a concep-
tually perfect taxonomy. "While the horizontal dimension of different sets
or classes can be well expressed by any icind of symbolism, we know of no other
efficient system to express simultaneously also the vertical dimension of
classes, sub-classes, sub-sub-classes, etc." [pp. 62-63] In a base-10 numeral
system representation of the ntunber system, the emissive taxons for sequen-
tially finer partitions are called "tenths," "hundredths," "thousandths," etc.
Cutting across this vertical dimension, each taxon is a set of exclusive clas-
ses that exhaust the conceptual universe, unity, and are ordered from zero.
Conqjutational effectiveness is due to this absolute reference base. Computa-
tional efficiency is gained by the syntactics of integer placement which was
first developed by the Babylonians with a base 60 system [Kline, p. 14-15].
Without these taxonomic properties, functional relations in the number system
(as represented by artificial objects such as "-f," "-," "x," "t," "-," etc.)
would be meaningless, and measurement operations (such as add, subtract, multi-
ply, divide, equals, etc.) would be impossible. Without taxonomic properties
of both horizontal and vertical class relations, measurement scales would be
meaningless and useless for mediating between numerals and the magnitude
characteristics of extra-lingual objects.
Measurement theory since Stevens [ 1946, 1959] has often divided scales into
four kinds. According to Mattessich [p. 59] it is:
"a matter of opinion which jump is regarded to be the critical one
In determining what constitutes measurement and what not: the
step from verbal description to numerical classification, that
from the nominal scale to the ordering of classes by means of
the ordinal scale, or that from the latter to a scale which en-
forces regularity of class-internal. .
.
, or even the step from
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the interval scale to a ratio scale which requires a zero-point
that is not arbitrarily chosen but given somehow beyond mere
convention.
"
Such opinion, however, ought to be grounded on some criteria for rational
choice. The concept of similarity and its diverse forms provides such ground-
ing. If the taxonomic interpretation of categorical relations among numbers is
accepted, the ordinal > interval, and ratio scales can be seen as subsets of
the larger concept, classification.
However, numerals In nominal usage do not systematically represent num-
bers . Nominal nvimerals only tag objects with names. The only systematic dif-
ference between different names is difference itself, which is not a positive
relation. Since there is no magnitudinal relation among numerals considered
as names only, the nominal "scale" cannot express any class relation among
referent objects. The nominal "scale" is not even plain analogy because there
is no relation among numerals considered as names only. [Torgerson, p. 52]
Since numerals as name labels do not represent any concept that is similar to
any characterisf'c of the objects being amed, no transitive characteristic
for determining class equivalence is represented by a nominal "scale." The
use of a nominal "scale" does not qualify as measurement if the purpose of
measurement is to represent a given relation among characteristics by the pre-
determined relation among nuribers. Indeed, nominal usage of numerals should
not even be called a "scale" if "scale" implies some relation among the ele-
ments of NRS.
The ordinal and interval scales represent classification by relative rank
and relative distance. The ratio scale is used for all operations which are,
in ordinary usage, described as measures. According to classical measurement
theory, there is a happy conjunction between this ordinary usage and rigorous
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discrimination among terms because only numerals assigned with a ratio scale
should properly be called measures. Even the most elementary measuring opera-
tion, counting discrete recurrences, requires the reference base, zero, for the
numerals to represent magnitudes. Non-representative manipulation of numerals
may be an interesting, information enterprise in itself, but no calculation
representing extra-lingual operations is possible with numeral relations re-
stricted to ordinal or interval characteristics because all kinds of statistical
measures require for their computation a ratio scale [Lim, p. 643], Modern
measurement theory tends to neglect this requirement.
If the use of numerals as names, ranks, intervals, or measures is not to
lead us into error and absurdity, the qualitative differences among objects
being represented must be examined carefully. (Mattessich, for example,
[p, 62-63] mistakenly interpreted the place-holding usage of numerals as con-
sistent with a nominal, rather than ordinal, scale. Place is an ordinal
concept.
)
The problem of whether a particular scale ("NRS") can yield a vali<i mea-
sure (ERS) depends upon what can be done with the scale rather than upon what
can be done to it. This distinction between the events of d&ing to and doing
with has generally been overlooked in the accounting literature on measurement.
(For example, see AAA. (1971) p. 312). Inherent characteristics of an object
are discovered through study of what can be done to it. Environmental or cir-
cumstantial relations are discovered through study of what can be done with it.
Consider the following illustration.
Morphological transformations of water establish its natural definition
as an object considered in its own right apart from any question of usage.
Things that can be done to water include these changes in the Internal relations
among elements:
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(1) creating it (by burning hydrogen and oxygen)
(2) freezing it (by lowering its t'='-inperature below 0° centigrade)
(3) evaporating it (by exposing it to an unsaturated atmosphere)
(4) contaminating it (by solution or suspension of foreign elements)
(5) decomposing it (by electrolysis into hydrogen and oxygen)
Operational manipulations of water and its trans fonoatlons are viewed
as tools for accomplishing purposes. Placement, movement, and containment are
circumstantial and as such do not change the nature of water. Things that can
be done with water include these external, circumstantial relations:
(1) traveling (by swimming in it, skating on it or other propulsion)
(2) drinking (by swallowing the liquid form)
(3) bathing (by contamination)
(4) air cooling (by evaporation)
(5) selling (by exchanging legal ownership)
Similarly, measurement scales can be done to or done with . By analogy, if
numbers are useful tools for measuring, then niomeral scales should be classified
according to v;ha can be done with them. Only the ratio scale can be used for
computing statistics since only it has a natural reference base. Computing
statistics is not something that can be done with an ordinal or interval scale.
(Similarly, drinking water cannot be done with evaporation.)
This distinction between with and to is exemplified by the difference be-
tween tables IV and V. Table IV is a reporduction of Mattessich's (p. 70) adap-
tation from Stevens. The heading precisely and correctly summarizes the contents:
"Examples of Statistical Measures Applicable to Measurements Made On the Various
Classes of Scales." Table V is a rearrangement of Table IV to precisely and
correctly summarize the "Examples of Statistical Measure Computable With Various
Classes of Scales."
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TABLE IV
Examples of Statistical Measures Applicable to
Measurements Made on Various Classes of Scales
\Classe3 of
\Scales Ratio\
i
Interval
Classes \> Ordinal
of \
Statistics \ Nominal
Measures of
Location Mode Median Mean Geometric Mean
Harmonic Mean
Dispersions Information Percentiles Standard
Average
Deviation
Percent
Variation
Association as
Correlation
Information
Transmitted (T)
Contingency
Correlation
Rank-Order
Correlation
Product-Moment
Correlation;
Correlation
Rank
Significance
Tests
Chi Square Test Sign Te<?t
Run Test
Critical Ratio
Test
t Test
F Test
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TABLE V
Examples of Statistical Measures Computable
with Various Classes of Scales
\ Classes of\ Scales
\ Nominal Ordinal Interval Ratio
Classes \
of \
Statistics ^
Measures of
Location Mode; median;
Arithmetic mean
Geometric Mean
Harmonic Mean
Dispersions
Information (H)
Percentiles
Standard Deviation
Percent Variation
Association
Information
Transmitted (T)
Contingency
Correlation
Rank-Order
Correlation
Produc t"Moment
Correlation
Correlation Ratio
Significance
Chl-Square Test
Sign Test
Run Test
Critical Ratio
Test
t. Test
F Test
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Thls section has thus shown that (1) the structure of valid measurement
may be construed as a rich composite of similarity relations, that (2) any-
thing less rigorous than a ratio scale weakens the representation by a numeral
of its referent, and that (3) the subject on which a measure is made must be
specified in a theory context. With the hope that the term "measurement" need
not degenerate into a buzzword that has lost its rigorous meaning, we turn in
the final section to measurement and accounting theory.
MEASUREMENT AND ACCOITNTING THEORY
While recent use of the term "measurement" in accounting has included non-
monetary items, the argument here is restricted to units of money. The focus
is on the fundamental function of money in an exchange economy, namely as a
medium for indirect rather than barter exchange. Money is a social object rep-
resenting the indirect exchange ratios of all economic goods and services.
Monetary price is an observable characteristic of the market. The other two
functions of money, as a standard of value and as a store of value, are deriva-
tive, secondary, and not observable. Chcimbers [1965, p. 39] says exchange is
the only function of money, and certainly if money had no use in exchange (as
in a non-market or a barter economy) it would have no use as a standard or store
of value, and hence no service potential. Monetary value is not characteristic
of the market, but rather a stipulated attribute of some conceptual relation.
Statements of value are incorrigible assertions, while statements of price are
testable propositions. The terms "price" and "value" have been used in account-
ing literature with at least four different semantic relations: (1) as defini-
tional synonyms, ("Value is price"); (2) as surrogatlon ("Value is measured by
price") ; (3) as functional relations ("Values determine price" or "prices
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deterraine value;" and (4) as substantially different and independent concepts,
the usage here.
This fundamental/derivative split in the functions and interpretations
of money is reflected in the difference between the events approach to account-
ing theory, which is primary, and the value approach, which is secondary.
[Sorter, 1969; Johnson, 1970] This split can be illustrated by quotations
from Paton and from Littleton.
Paton wrote [1922, p. 433] "The crux of accounting theory and accounting
practice. . .is valuation." That idea does indeed dominate present thinking,
but it rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of the relation between money
and the various objects being accounted for. That similarity relation is the
central applied issue of this paper. The misunderstanding of the value approach
to accounting theory is the assertion of unwarranted similarity relations
—
plain analogies or loose fictions masquarading as strong representations of
accurate facts.
Littleton wrote in his final publication [1970, p. 471] "Mutual acceptance
[of a market exchange transaction] creates an indisputable, quantitative fact.
That [event] fact is not Value; it is pi'iee. . .emerging. . .from separate valuation
judgments satisfactory to both parties."
Both event theory and value theory must deal with the summation problem.
That aspect of measurement is not a fundamental difference between them. As
Churchman observed [1959, p. 89] about measurement, "One wants to be able to
assert that [object] x has [characteristic] property y under conditions z at
time t." For accountants the measurement problem is compounded because finan-
cial reports sura across objects, across characteristics, across conditions,
and across time. The concern in this paper is much deeper than the question
of whether a monetary characteristic meets the requirements for additivity.
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The central questions are these:
"Of what objects are monetary measures truly characteristic, and
what characteristic of money do numbers of dollars (or of any other
numeraire) truly represent?"
Vickrey [1976, p. 32] reasoned as follows:
"...if the numerical assignments of a given accounting system are
shown to be inconsistent with the rules of measurement theory,
then the implication is that we should be pessimistic about the
relevance of these values in the development of a scientific theory
of accounting (because values such as these generally are of
limited value in scientific theorizing)."
His argument needs to be extended one level deeper toward a bedrock foun-
dation for accounting theory. If none of the numerical assignments in terms
of money comply with the rules of measurement theory, then there can be no
scientific theory of accounting that has explanatory, precictive, and descrip-
tive powers like those disciplines usually accepted as being sciences. The
rules of measurement to which a scientific theory system must comply include
the constraints of both the numeral relation system and the empirical relation
system. That is, to be a science, accounting theory must justify both aspects
of measurement, NRS and ERS, with CRS that is a strong representing relation.
I propose that whatever validity may reside in the language of mathematics
(NRS) the nature of money (ERS) precludes financial accounting from ever be-
coming a measurement science ±£^ accounting is concerned with valuing assets,
equities, and entities.
For example, consider price-level adjustments. The argument is made [e.g.,
Moonitz, 1970, pp. 465-466] that the difference between historical cost numerals
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and price-level-adjusted numerals has no more significance than the difference
between meters and feet or kilos and pounds, all three being pure scale trans-
formations with no change in the phenomena being represented by numerals. But
such argument has the following error: the phenomena represented by numerals,
market relations, do change, with both particular and general significance.
Length and weight are inherent elemental characteristics of natural and arti-
ficial concrete objects. Money is a relational characteristic of the market,
a social object encompassing owners and possessions. The monetary relation
(price) is internal to specific markets, but external to both the owners and
the exchangeable possessions. Both present and potential owners may attribute
service potential (expected monetary value in use) to the exchangeable objects.
But value attributions are ownership concepts and not characteristics of either
markets or exchangeable objects. The possibility of valid scale transformations
from one NRS to another does not in itself establish the accuracy of an incor-
rigible CRS (subjective monetary values) as a representation of an ERS (objective
market prices)
.
Vickrey's concern for additivity is warranted only if—as many authors
state or imply—money is a characteristic of the objects in financial reports
(that is, assets, equities and entities), or if the various markets from which
prices are taken are sufficiently similar and stable. But neither. of these
conditions hold. Price is a relation between exchangeable items within a
market system, and neither prices nor values are stable.
Consider the market relation of one dime and two nickels. In barter terms,
one dime exchanges for two nickels. But two nickels is not a characteristic of
the dime. In monetary terms, with the dollar as numeraire, the price of both
the dime and the two nickels is ten cents. The monetary price, ten cents, is
a generalized relation characteristic of some markets. In different markets
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under different circumstances, the dime might exchange for a diamond; but the
diamond would not be a characteristic of the dime, and neither the dime nor the
diamond would be a characteristic of the two nickels or of the entity owners.
Whether the summation of several market relations from various tiroes and places
might be an index representing some other market relation is strictly a prag-
matic problem and cannot be described accurately as a scientific measurement
problem.
Two issues arise from the pragmatic interpretation of monetary smmnation
indices. How accurately do prices (the internal exchange relations of a set
of markets) represent values (the various external relations between owners
and possessions)? How accurately does the mind of the accountant or accountor
preparing the reports represent the minds of numerous different users? Both
questions have the same answer: Not necessarily very well, and possibly not
at all.
Though the term "current value accounting" is now popular, emphasis on
any value theory which focuses on subjective expectations of service potential
is a weaker justification for either exit or entry prices than is event theory
which focuses continuously on market exchangeability. Indeed, the very nature
of money is an argximent supporting accounting reports that emphasize current
market prices. Sxnranations of current market prices are likely to be more
accurate predictors of future market relations than summations of obsolete his-
torical costs because the probability of empirical error varies directly with
lapsed time.
The predictive validity test has been offered as guide to scientific choice
when two information systems both pass all the tests for logical validity. But
since no financial accounting system can pass the logical tests of measurement
science, the predictive validity test may guide a pragmatic choice between
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information systems that eqiaally fail the tests of logical validity. Debates
over "measurement theory" aspects of historical cost and price-level-adjustments
are futile, if not altogether irrelevant. Money does not 'have" generalized
purchase power as a characteristic. Money by definition is generalized purchase
power, and financial reports should emphasize by separate disclosure the dis-
tinction between monetary amounts as ERS (summations of prices from many markets)
and CRS (calculations of alleged values.)
Concern for value in accounting has led to legalistic, conventional, au-
thoritarian GAAP calculations. Concern for price may lead to scientific,
reasoned, empirical GAAP observations. In value theory, objectivity is just a
constraint on the use of models. [Penman, 1970] But in event theory, objec-
tivity is an inherent, determinant part of the model emphasizing market price
relations.
CONCLUSIONS
No one has a right to claim to know the size, shape, color, position or
value of things >rhich by their nature c nnot bear such characterization.
[Jlargenau, 1972, p. 10] Attributing smell to a beam of light is no less in-
accurate a characterization than attributing value to assets, equities, or
entities. Costs do not attach and "as if" analogies do not constitute
scientific measurement representations.
The simplistic view that dollars measure assets and equities may contribute
to the criticism that accounting reports with only monetary data are inade-
quate. The unwarranted interpretation that value is a characteristic of
assets and equities may enforce allegations that GAAP are not useful for de-
cisions. Whether there is any similarity between summations of past or present
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market relations and markets for different properties at different times and
places is strictly a question of index usefulness. It is not a question of
scientific measurement.
Consistent emphasis on accounting reports as summations of market rela-
tions (prices, not values) can serve to distinguish unbiased accountants from
charlatans since the former will sometimes discipline their professional prac-
tice with a little reflection on (l) the categorical difference between price
and value, (2) the instability of both price and value in a monetary exchange
economy, and (3) the tenuous similarity between value attributions by various
accountors, accountees, and accountants.
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